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Appellant is not incarcerated

SUPPLEMENTAL OPENING BRIEF
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DEBRA M. NELSON (9176)
HEATHER BRERETON (8151)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
JOHN N.BREMS (3769)
GEORGE B. HOFMANN (10005)
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents/Appellees

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JUSTIN BRENT PETERSON,
Petitioner/Appellant

:

v.
SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD;
CHIEF PAUL CUNNINGHAM;
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL;
TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICE COURT,
Respondents/Appellees

:

Case No. 20030264-CA

;

Appellant is not incarcerated

SUPPLEMENTAL OPENING BRIEF
Appeal from a denial of a petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant was
convicted of possession of a controlled substance in Taylorsville Justice Court and was
sentenced to a suspended jail sentence. He subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Sandra Peuler, Judge, presiding, which was denied.

DEBRA M. NELSON (9176)
HEATHER BRERETON (8151)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
JOHN N. BREMS (3769)
GEORGE B. HOFMANN (10005)
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents/Appellees

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

INTRODUCTION

1

ARGUMENT

2

POINT. UNDER LUCERO v. KENNARD APPELLANT'S
POST-CONVICTION PETITION WAS PROPER UNDER
THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION
CONCLUSION

2
7

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

Cases
Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968 (Utah 1968)

5

Codianna v.Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983)
Gardner v.Holden, 888 P.2d 608 (Utah 1994)
Lucero v. Kennard, et.al., 2005 UT 79, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. 21

ii

5, 6
6
1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JUSTIN BRENT PETERSON,

:

Petitioner/Appellant
v.

:

SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD;
CHIEF PAUL CUNNINGHAM;
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL;
TAYLORSVILLE JUSTICE COURT,

:

Case No. 20030264-CA

;

Respondents/Appellees
INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 2004, Appellant filed his opening brief which contained the
statement of the case, facts, and arguments. See Appellant's Opening Brief. On March
31, 2004, the Appellee filed its response brief to Appellant's opening brief. See
Appellees' Response Brief On June 2, 2004, this Court granted Appellant's motion to
stay the briefing schedule pending the outcome of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in
Lucero v. Kennard, et.aL 2005 UT 79, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. In response to the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Lucero issued November 15, 2005, this Court ordered
supplemental briefing in this case addressing any effect the supreme court's opinion in
Lucero had in this matter. As requested by the Court, Appellant limits supplemental
briefing to the impact of the Lucero opinion in this case. Appellant will address

appellees' arguments made in its response brief after Appellees have filed a supplemental
response brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT. UNDER LUCERO v. KENNARD APPELLANT'S POSTCONVICTION PETITION WAS PROPER UNDER THE UNUSUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION.
The supreme court's decision in Lucero, clarifies that the post-conviction
procedure utilized by Mr. Peterson was proper. In this case, where Mr. Peterson was
deprived of his right to counsel and was not represented by an attorney until two years
after judgment, unusual circumstances justified filing a petitioner for post-conviction
review. Because Mr. Peterson was deprived of his right to counsel in the justice court
proceedings, as set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, and was not represented within
the time for filing for a trial de novo appeal, the post-conviction procedure was
appropriate and reversal of the district court's order is required.
In Lucero, the supreme court "considered whether the Post-Conviction Remedies
Act ("PCRA") allows collateral attacks on a justice court conviction when the defendant
has failed to seek a trial de novo."1 Id. at ^[1. The supreme court concluded that justice
court defendants are eligible for post-conviction relief under the PCRA. Id. at ^ 6 , 9.
Nevertheless, the court required that a justice court defendant exhaust his legal remedies
by seeking a trial de novo "where an appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation

1

In this case, the justice court did not argue that Mr. Peterson was barred from obtaining
post-conviction relief because he did not seek a trial de novo or that review was not
permitted under the unusual circumstances exception.
2

would be a new trial." Id. at f 38.

The court concluded that the defendant in Lucero,

was procedurally barred from seeking post-conviction relief because he filed a petition
for post-conviction relief instead of seeking a trial de novo appeal. Id. at^|41.
Despite a failure to exhaust legal remedies by filing an appeal, the court
determined in Lucero that a defendant may still be eligible to have a petition reviewed if
he meets the unusual circumstances exception. Id. at ^|42. The court implicitly
recognized that the unusual circumstances test may be met when a defendant is deprived
of his constitutional right to counsel. Id. at ^43-45. Considering whether Lucero could
have his post-conviction petition for relief reviewed under the unusual circumstances
exception, the court concluded that because Lucero was represented by "counsel at the
time he decided to pursue post-conviction relief instead of trial de novo" and "filed his
petition for post-conviction relief within thirty days of the date that the justice court
entered its sentence" the unusual circumstances exception was not met. Id. at ^|46.
Therefore, Lucero, was not entitled to review of his petition for post conviction relief. Id.
at ^[47. By contrast, in this case, Mr. Peterson is eligible to have his petition for postconviction relief reviewed under the unusual circumstances exception because at the time
he filed his petition he was not statutorily eligible to file for a trial de novo and was not
represented by counsel until almost two years after entry of the date of sentence. R. 1-5;
13.
To qualify for the unusual circumstances exception to the procedural bar
rules, a petitioner must demonstrate that "an obvious injustice or a
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right" has occurred."
"The unusual circumstances test was intended to assure fundamental
fairness and to require reexamination of a conviction on habeas corpus
3

when the nature of the alleged error was such that it would be
unconscionable not to reexamine . . . thereby to assure that substantial
justice was done."
Id. at Tf45 (citations omitted).
While a petition for post-conviction relief may not be appropriately reviewed
when a justice court defendant fails to exhaust his remedies by filing for a trial de novo
when the alleged violation is the right to counsel, it is reviewable when unusual
circumstances exist. IdL at ^47. In Lucero, the supreme court found that unusual
circumstances did not exist because "he filed his petition for post-conviction relief within
thirty days of the date that the justice court entered its sentence." Id at ^46. And "[a]t
that time, Lucero was still statutorily eligible to file for trial de novo." IdL In addition,
"[t]he record indicat[d] that Lucero was represented by counsel at the time he decided to
pursue post-conviction relief instead of a trial de novo. Given these facts, the
circumstances surrounding [Lucero's] case [did] not rise to the level of an obvious
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right." Id. This case is
factually distinguishable.
In this case, Mr. Peterson appeared injustice court pro se and pled guilty on July
18, 2000. R. 13. The docket entry shows that he was sentenced to 360 days in jail which
was suspended. R. 13. On July 25, 2000, the court found Mr. Peterson in violation of his
probation and imposed his original jail sentence. R. 13. On August 30, 2000, the court
suspended the balance of his sentence and probation was set. R. 13. On February 13,
2001, due to Mr. Peterson's failure to appear for his drug review, the court reimposed his
360 day jail sentence with credit for time served for 36 days. R. 16. On August 9, 2002,
4

more than two years after judgment was entered, the Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association filed a petition for post-conviction relief on behalf of Mr. Peterson, who was
being held in the Salt Lake County Jail. R. 1-5. Therefore, Mr. Peterson's case differs
from Lucero in that he did not obtain the assistance of counsel until over two years after
his original sentence was imposed and well past the statutory time frame in which to file
for a trial de novo. Because Mr. Peterson could no longer remedy the violation of his
right to counsel through a trial de novo, the petition was the only means available to
request review of his illegally imposed sentence.
Unusual circumstances justifying collateral review exist when a defendant claims
that he was denied the right to counsel at trial. As recognized by the supreme court, "the
analysis of whether a defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief is .. . complicated in
cases where a defendant raises a deprivation of counsel claim because of the 'special
status' conferred upon the constitutional right to counsel." Lucero 2005 UT 79 at ^[25
(citations omitted). For example, in Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 970 (Utah 1968), the
defendant claimed that he had been denied his right to counsel and was not properly
advised regarding the consequences of his plea. Id Although the court denied Brown's
claims, it reviewed those claims on the merits, thereby implicitly acknowledging that the
claims constitute unusual circumstances justifying collateral review. Justice Stewart
recognized this in his concurring opinion in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1114-16
(Utah 1983) (Stewart, J. concurring)), stating:
In Brown this Court in fact addressed the merits of the habeas petitioner's
claims: it did not dismiss them solely on the ground that the alleged errors
were known or should have been known at the time of conviction. The
5

petitioner's claims in that case were that he had been denied his right to
counsel and that he was not properly advised of the consequences of his
plea of guilty. A reading of the opinion makes clear that the petitioner
either knew or should have known at the time of his conviction of those
errors that were later asserted in his habeas petition. Although the court
ruled that there is no merit to those claims, the critical point here is that the
Court deemed it entirely appropriate to address the merits even though
petitioner had failed to take a direct appeal.
Id. at 1114 (Stewart, J. concurring).
The supreme court has now explicitly reaffirmed this position in Lucero by
mandating that even if "a court determines that a defendant is procedurally barred from
seeking post-conviction relief, the court must. . . ascertain whether the defendant is
nevertheless entitled to have an appellate court review the petition because unusual
circumstances exist." Lucero, 2005 UT 79 at ^43. Lucero makes clear that absent the
ability to file for a trial de novo within the statutory time frame along with the continued
absence of the assistance of counsel qualifies as unusual circumstances "ris[ing] to the
level of an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional
right." Id at f46. When a defendant has been denied the assistance of counsel, it would
be "unconscionable not to reexamine . . . thereby [ensuring] that 'substantial justice [was]
done.'" Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994)(citations omitted).
Because Mr. Peterson has demonstrated that unusual circumstances exist in his
case, he is entitled to review of his petition for post-conviction relief under the unusual
circumstances exception.

6

CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth herein and in Appellant's Opening Brief, Justin
Brent Peterson, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the lower court's decision and
order that his jail sentence be vacated.

SUBMITTED this A 2 ^ day of January, 2006.

DEBRA M. NELSO
Attorney for Appellant
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